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The Second Malvinas crisis?  
Argentina and Oil Prospecting  
Off the Falkland Islands 
“GOTCHA” was the iconic British tabloid title that greeted the sinking of the Belgrano, the Argentine battle ship, in one of the most controversial events 
during the brief but costly 1982 conflict between Argentina and 
the UK over the Falklands Islands. Never particularly sensitive, 
one wonders how the same paper would now greet a sizable 
oil discovery in the icy waters off the disputed archipelago in 
the south Atlantic. Some clues have emerged since the start of a 
drilling campaign in the waters around the Falklands by a group of London-listed oil companies, 
a development which Argentina has loudly protested. 
The war is etched in the consciousness of both Britain and Argentina—the latter’s defeat 
remains a sour point. Buenos Aires has always claimed sovereignty over the Falkland Islands or 
Islas Malvinas and annually restates its claim. The return of oil prospectors to the islands has 
inflamed past grievances and Argentina has launched a concerted diplomatic effort, collecting 
the backing of fellow Latin American states as well as lukewarm support from the US. Diplomatic 
relations have certainly been strained but the chance of real conflict is remote – despite the 
jingoistic rhetoric which has been cranked-up in both Britain and Argentina. 
However, the war of words masks far deeper issues in Argentina. The feeling that Argentina’s 
beleaguered president Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner is looking to score political points 
domestically by, yet again, kicking-up a fuss over the Falklands is hard to avoid. Legally the 
UK has little say over what decisions are made in Port Stanley, the tiny capital of the Falklands 
Islands, having devolved power over management of its surrounding waters in the mid-1990s. 
Additionally, Argentina turned its back on potentially benefiting from Falklands oil when Ms 
Fernandez’s predecessor (and husband) Nestor Kirchner revoked an agreement with the UK to 
cooperate over exploration in the islands surrounding waters. 
Despite annual protest at the United Nations, Argentina has made little progress on the Falklands 
issue; residents of the islands argue they have the right to self determination and have little 
desire to be part of Argentina. Nor do they consider the islands a British colony. It’s a situation 
that is unlikely to change anytime soon. Perversely the arrival of oil prospectors offers Argentina 
an opportunity, namely the chance to reflect on the state of its own oil industry. 
TOM FREIJE
is the Energy Editor 
at the Economist 
Intelligence Unit. 
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SALT IN OLD wOUNDS
The seeds of this current falling-out were sown 
in the unsatisfying conclusion of the 1982 
conflict. It was a war that irrevocably shaped 
the recent past of both Argentina and the 
UK. For Buenos Aires the wounds of that past 
defeat remain tender, yet defeat also hastened 
the country’s move towards democracy. On 
the flipside it was a victory that cemented 
the position of the UK’s then Prime Minister 
Margret Thatcher. The following seven years 
had a transformative impact on the UK. 
And herein an inherent parallel lies in 
this current ‘crisis’ – a leader struggling 
domestically seeking to make an issue of 
the Falklands. Ms Fernandez’s efforts are 
disappointing. Argentines appear to be taking 
an increasingly dim view of her government, 
her personal popularity is low and recent 
votes have weakened her grip on office – her 
party and allies lost control of both houses 
of Congress in mid-term elections in 2009. 
In addition, Ms Fernandez’s administrative 
style has been characterised by heavy-handed 
interventions in the economy and repeated 
feuds with other government institutions and 
with the private sector. These have hardly 
endeared her to business. 
Most recently, she faced an institutional crisis 
over her firing of the Central Bank head (an 
effort she ultimately succeeded in) and her 
attempts to transfer Central Bank reserves to 
a special Treasury account (where she proved 
less successful). At the same time, the economy 
has been performing poorly and the public 
finances are growing increasingly precarious. 
As the 2011 presidential election approaches, 
Ms Fernandez is seeking to tap an issue that 
remains one of the few unifying grievances in 
Argentina to enhance her domestic position. 
It is, however, hard to see the tangible benefits 
of such a strategy for the government. The 
loss of Congress has certainly created a more 
complicated situation for Ms Fernandez, 
whose legislative control will be lessened in 
the second half of her term regardless. Further 
she will be forced to negotiate with opposition 
forces for the first time.
How easy she will find a conciliatory approach 
remains to be seen. The governments of both 
Mrs Kirchner and her predecessor husband 
have been aggressive in style and compromise 
with the opposition has not been a feature. 
The likely result is legislative stalemate and 
heightened political tensions ahead of the 
2011 presidential election. The potential 
domestic legislative gridlock could be even 
more damaging given then challenging fiscal 
and financial conditions Argentina is facing. 
The government has prioritised economic 
growth, the restructuring of outstanding 
defaulted foreign debt and access tonew 
international financing. None of these 
goals will be assisted by blocking shipping 
to the Falklands and reiterating territorial 
claims – whatever the merits of the arguments. 
In sum, the vehement protests smack of 
orchestrated distraction. 
LOvE THy NEIGHBOUr? 
Meanwhile, the Argentine government’s 
relationship with foreign oil and gas firms 
is far from stellar, and the country’s own oil 
production is declining. The fact that the 
Falklands has been able to attract investment 
serves as a reminder to Buenos Aires 
that it could well do with spending some 
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time worrying about its own domestic oil industry. That the attractive terms offered by the 
Falklands islands, which are charging royalties of just 9 percent per barrel produced, 
have proved sufficient to entice independents to take the plunge is revealing. In contrast 
the two Kirchner administrations have done little to encourage private initiative in Argentina’s 
domestic energy industry. 
The story of Spanish firm repsol’s tie-up with Argentine firm yPF in 1999, a year after Argentine 
oil production peaked, is a case in point. Hailed as something of a masterstroke at the time, 
repsol paid US$15 billion for yPF after it was partly privatised at the start of the decade. The 
purchase doubled the size of the company, which changed its trading name to repsol yPF. But 
it all went sour three years later as the Argentine economy went into freefall. In the ensuing 
mess, repsol was left with a pile of debt, raised for the purchase, and a business unit trapped 
in an economy being devastated by hyperinflation. Price controls meant that yPF was forced to 
sell its oil and gas for one-third of world prices. 
repsol has subsequently sought to reduce its exposure to Argentina by selling some of its yPF 
stake to Argentine banker Enrique Eskenazi, who has ties to former President Nestor Kirchner. 
There have also been regular rumours that repsol would like to get shot of yPF, with reported 
Chinese interest. And all this despite the fact that yPF accounted for 64.7 percent of group 
output and 53.7 percent of group net crude oil reserves in 2008. That yPF has been something 
of a poisoned chalice has much to do with Buenos Aires. yPF’s profitability has been stunted by 
low domestic gas prices, high oil export duties and erratic volumes. 
It is a microcosm of Argentina’s oil industry. Crude oil production, according to the BP Statistical 
review, has fallen steadily since 1998 when output peaked at 890,000 barrels per day. Crude oil 
production in 2008 was 682,000 barrels per day and could well fall below 650,000 barrels per day 
this year. yPF will drill a well in Argentine waters later this year, in a consortium with Pan American 
Energy (majority owned by BP) and Brazil’s Petrobras. But the Kirchners may wish to ask 
themselves why an extensive exploration programme is taking place right next door to 
Argentina’s territorial waters. 
For examples of how to do things better the Argentines could consider the example of the 
islands they so dearly want back. Also they could look north to Brazil or Colombia. Both have 
created frameworks enticing to foreign oil firms. The results have been striking in both cases. 
Brazil’s Atlantic subsalt play is now considered to be one of the most exciting in the world, 
a new multi-billion barrel basin. Despite recent legislation to increase the state’s say over its 
subsalt reserves, it is unlikely that the play would have been opened up without the 1997 
law which attracted foreign companies, including repsol. Colombia, too, has seen production 
and reserves rise rapidly following the government’s concerted efforts to improve security and 
improve licensing terms. Despite a smaller proven reserve base, Colombia is expected to have 
overtaken Argentina as Latin America’s third largest oil producer last year. 
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MUTUAL BENEFITS
Successful development, assuming a 
commercial discovery, would be made far 
easier by Argentine support. It could also 
prove a boon for Argentine service firms and 
potentially its own oil industry. Argentina 
would be a logical processing base for 
Falkland’s crude and, potentially even, a future 
market. Aware of this, Argentina has used 
its one real step of redress, announcing in 
early February that it would begin to require 
permits for any ships sailing from Argentina 
to the Falklands, or for those sailing through 
Argentina’s territorial waters. Though perfectly 
entitled to follow this course of action, 
Argentina has much to gain from exploration 
in the southern Atlantic; after all, its territorial 
waters are vast. 
Taking punitive action against the Falkland 
islanders – Argentina has also prevented a ship 
carrying pipes to the Falklands from leaving 
its ports – seems churlish. By slowing down 
exploration efforts in the region and making 
it logistically harder by restricting shipping 
Argentina is blocking what could ultimately 
prove a lucrative opportunity. Moreover, it 
is hardly as if oil exploration off the Falkland 
Islands is new. Exploratory wells were drilled 
off the Falklands in the late 1990s – of the six 
wells sunk, five showed signs of hydrocarbons 
– though with oil at around US$10 per barrel 
further drilling was deemed unprofitable.
with oil above US$75 per barrel the attraction 
of a large tract of unexplored acreage is 
understandable; especially one that has 
geology suggesting it could house vast 
oil reserves – 60 billion barrels according 
to a widely cited geologic sources. The 
companies leading the exploration effort, 
Desire Petroleum, rockhopper Exploration 
and Falkland Oil and Gas, are small, London-
listed independent oil companies that bear the 
classic hallmarks of “wild cat” explorers. 
Any find would transform the Falkland Islands’ 
economic fortunes but, for now at least, this 
remains a distant prospect; the gap between 
initial exploration work and commercial 
production is great – exploration does not 
equal discovery, nor does a discovery lead 
inexorably to production. Surprisingly, this 
fact has largely been lost in the maelstrom of 
words exchanged since the arrival of a single 
rig, the Ocean Guardian, which will drill up to 
ten wells in the waters around the islands. 
London is an easy target for an unpopular 
Argentine administration. But despite the 
vitriol being directed towards the UK, the 
decision about the terms and licensing of 
exploration was transferred from London to 
Port Stanley in the late 1990s. The Falkland 
Islanders’ right to determine what activity 
takes place in its territorial waters was even 
recognised by Argentina in 1995 when it 
signed the Joint Declaration over Oil with 
the UK. The deal also included provisions for 
joint exploration around the islands. However, 
Argentina bailed on the agreement in 2007. 
The success (or not) of Desire Petroleum’s 
exploration program will provide Argentina 
with an indication of the resources potential 
in the southern Atlantic. with the first 
offshore drilling campaign of consequence 
scheduled to take place in Argentine territorial 
waters later this year, Buenos Aires may well 
wish to consider how it can attract more 
exploration instead of worrying about the 
Falklands sovereignty. ■
